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Presented to the Department 
of Economics Oberlin College, 
December 16, 1960 
by 
James G. Scoville 
Since the appearence of Keynes' General Theory the major point of 
macro-economic emphasis has been upon the conditions and inducements 
necessary for capital investment. The general view on the dynamic pro-
cesses of the economy has been largely altered in this past quarter cen-
tury. No longer do we believe that what is saved automatically finds its 
way into investment, with total demand---and, hence, income---remaining 
constant. The Great Depression the development of fairly decent time 
series, and the often biting words of Keynes have given business cycle 
theory a new outlook and a new direction. J do not propose to discuss 
all these facts in this short paper the consideration of the classical 
views and the examination of the ideas of Keynes and his s11ccessors can 
~ell be left to the reader. Instead, our attentinn shall be focussed on 
a very limited aspect of the problem or capital investment, namely, the 
plant and equipment ex,ienditures of manufacturers during a short period 
of time. An attempt will be made to go beyond the simple statistical 
analysis to discover other factors operatlve in this period, and their 
possible effects upon our results. 
I 
The figures and series used in this paper are largely the product
of the Office of Business Economics Department of Commerce, and are taken 
from the "Survey of Current Business" and its Supplements. The means used 
to obtain these statistics are varied and sometimes not entirely reputable
Those employed the most in this paper are estimates of manufacturers' plant
and equipment expendituresand sales, the realized figures and the antici-
pations for both these catagories, as given at the beginning of each year.
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These f figures are usually reported in either the Mar ch or April "Survey." 
The limitations of these data should be understood before they are put 
to use; indeed, the weakness are legion. The original figures are ob-
tained by written reports from various manufacturers, which reports are made
voluntarily except for approximately one thousand large corporations re-
quired to report to the Securities and Exchange Commission. Among the smaller 
firms, the tendency is not to re,-,ort if they have spent nothing---this has 
led to a sample which is stratified in a distinctly top-heavy manner, al-
though corrections have been made for this. Furthermore, it is hardly an 
exaggeration to conclude that no two persons who fill out the questionnaire 
have the same idea of the information desired • . For the purposes of this 
paper, however, the most disturbing matter is that the Department of Com-
merce is not concerned with what manufacturers actually expect, but with
predicting what will really happen. Therefore, there is a constant juggling 
of the figures on the basis of past experience, which makes their data of 
more value as forecasts, but which represents a caveat to the writer of this 
paper. Anticipations are reported in the "Survey" with such precise ex-
oressions as: 'somewat over eight percent,• 'about four percent,' and so 
on. The anticipations figures which I have used are calculated on the basis
of the most reasonable reading of sucl; statements. 
On the assets side of the balance sheet, there are several factors
which recomment these data. Only aggregate figures for manufacturing shall 
be used, which gives us the hope that the errors of the constituent cate-
gor ies will have cancelled one another. A fact that betokens the absence 
of some possible 'corrections' is that tbese figures are not made t o f it i nto 
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the breakdown of investment civen in the gross national product accounts. 
Although it must be said that the most appealing feature of these statis-
t i cs is their availability, they should be sound enough if used cautiously. 
II
It is a simple theoretica1 connection between consumption, invest-
ment, and the "mul tiplier" whichdemonstrates the power of changes in 
investment over the whole economic system. '!hereafter. the basic problem 
has continually presented itself: what are the reasons for fluctuations in 
the level of investment? In this paper, we shall primarily be looking at 
that which Keynes called the "principle of effective demand," as it is in-
volved with the manufacturing sector in the years 1949-19S7. It must be 
I 
remembered that there is not an automatic and mechanical link between 
changes in the effective demand (as represented by the sales of the firms 
involved) and the decision to invest. The final decision probably rests 
on a much more poorlydefined concept, that of "expectations," upon which
sales behavior should have an impact. At times in the statistical develop-
ment of the argument, it may seem that emphasis is being laid only upon 
the factor of demand, but, hopefully, other considerations will receive 
their due at a later point. It should be observed that the two categories 
denoted above, demand and expectations, cannot be strictly separate areas 
of consideration, even in the statistical sections. Although the data 
employed are in constant dollars, which eliminates some of. the effects of 
price changes of product and capital goods, it certainly would not elimi-
nate the effects of anticipated changes. There can be no through-going
segregation between demand and expectations.
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For the most part, the data used cover the period 1949-1957, al-
though there are some exceptions The price figures employed to reduce 
sales and expenditures to constant dollars were obtained from the most
recent source, u. s. Income and OutOutput, 1958'This is the reason for the 
cut-off date of 1957. 'lbe price figures for plant and equipment of Wooden 
and Wasson (presented in the November 1956 "Survey") were not used as 
they covered even a shorter period and were, in general, close to the 
figures for producers' durable equipment. Some series presented begin in 
19S0• as figures from 1949 were needed to determine various values (as in 
the discussion of tile derivation of anticipations). The starting date for 
this study (1949) is rather arbitrary, but it was felt wise not to push
the cover age further back: the ref erenccs in the "Survey" become even more 
vague, there were certain conwlsions in the population of the sample
shortly before the period covered, and thus ,oie avoid most of the immediate 
effects of the war. 
At this time, a brief explanation of the symbols employed may •,rove 
of value to the reader. The letters I and S shall ref er to plant and equip- 
mcnt expenditures and sales, respectively. Whenstanding alone, they will 
denote realized quantities ics, the subScriy,t ref erring to the year. When these 
letters are adjoined by a star (*) • they will refer to anticipated quan-
tities. The letter F will sometimes be used to designate a computed quan-
tity or a large collection of symbols. To dispel any fears. I will assure 
the reader that the mathematics in this paper will be simple and largely 
concealed in the body of the work • 
.Another point must be made: this paper does not attempt to present a 
model describing the operations of the manufacturing sector during tl1e years 
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1949-1957, into which one cnn plug the data and receive the proper answer
The statistical work is only an attempt to deduce various propositions 
concerning the behavior of manufacturing witlt regard to capital invest-
ment. Nor does this paper attempt to explainor depict the course of ac-
tion of any particular firm under given conditions; its conclusions apply 
only to the collective actions of manufacturers
III 
Wemight assume that manufacturers as a group would have their in-
vestment programs (''investment" is used, unless specifically stated other-
,ri.se, to mean "gross investment") closely tied to their sales. as the 
denand operative upon them affects directly the amount they produce If 
demand increases, and inventories are to remain the same, then investment 
should increase sufficiently to meet the rise in demand. and there should 
be a reverse effect if (demand falls Nevertheless, in view of inventory 
and order considerations, we might not have expectedthe extremely close 
relation which we find in the data. Expressed in billions 0£ constant 
(1954) dollars,1 the linear regression tor the years 1949-1957 (see figure 
1 on page 6) can be expressed thus : 
In= .638S., - 3.4 • 
While it is not correct to place heavy emphasis on a generalized regression
.- I ""'-~•4'-' 
fi . corralation"'1:l""' coefficienti ( ) . figuresuch as this the sample correlationcoe 1c ent .944 1s very 
sicnif icant---vle should expect such a result by chance about one time in 
a. million. 'lllus, our first proposition must be that in this period manu-
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Figure 1. 
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Pigure 2. 
Anticipated Investment and Sal.es in 1954 Dollars. 
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In regard to anticipated investment and anticipated sales, the same 
type of relationship bolds true. For the same period, in billions of 
constant dollars the relationship states that: (cf. figure 2, page 6) 
* * ID • o736SD - S.6 0 
Again the sample correlation coefficient (.816) is significantly high for 
thirteen degrees of freedom_ with approximately the previous probability 
of chance occurrence, so we deduce proposition two; during this neriod, 
manufacturers anticipated a firm relationship between annual investment 
and sales. 
IV 
Several matters come to mind from an inspection of these relation-
ships, all of which have implications for exonomic theory. In the first 
place, we notice that these equations are not the same -- that is to say, 
the relation of sales to investment and the relation of acticipated sales 
to anticipated investment are not _described by the same line. If sales 
should have turned out as anticipated, then investment would have differed 
from the anticip[ated fi~ure, 'lhe difference of relationships implies that, 
whatever happened, some part of the plans of manufacturers could not be 
3 
borne out in the resulatantt year. The direct consequence of this is a 
corollary that, as it existed during this period, the manuf acturincr sec-
tor of the economy was inherently unstable in view of the relation be-
betweeninvestment and sales uniformly achieved, the anticipated relation-
shio had to fail. Perhaps we c:an discover the reason for this by a closer 
look at the relationships themselves. In general, the level of antici-
pated investment was more closely tied to anticipated sales than was in-
" 
-s-
investmentied to sales. '!his is reflected in the fact that tlle coeffi-
cient is lari;cr in tb.e former relation •• 736 versus .638. This differ-
ence means that above a certain level of sales (about twenty-two billion 
constant dollars), the amount anticipated would exceed the actual investment
ment, and below this level anticipations would be less than what resulted. 
The key to the so1ution of this presumptuous paradox _is the fact that 
what we are calling here investment is really gross investment---it in-
includesexpenditures for replacement as well as expantion Thus, it would 
seem that above the $22 billion level of sales manufacturers have faultily 
estimated their expenditures by tying them too closely to sales; they have 
tended to prorate above the level where expanion began on the basis of 
tl:eir replacement expendituresper dollar of sales below that level. Below 
this level, they perhaps assumed that they would cut back expenditures at 
the same rate as they would have increased them in expanion forgetting
that the major part of their expenditures would be for replacement If 
this were the case, then we would expectthat manufacturers would have 
followed this course of action: to anticipate less investment below a cer-
tain level of sales than that which would be justified in the light of 
figure 1, and to "ovcr-anticipate" above this level. The following table 
indicates the results of this assumption
Year s * I * P (I which wou1d Conment n n 
be justified on 
the basis of Sn*) 
(Dillions of 1954 dollars) 
1949 19.4 8.7 9.0 As these sales figures are below 
1950 18.9 1.1 8.6 the $22 billion level, we should 
have expected P greater than In*. 
1951 23.3 13.4 11.4 canvcrse11, ,~ should have ex-
1952 23.1 12.s 11.3 l)eeted 1n greater than P. 
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Year s * D 1n* ' Comment 
1953 24.7 12.3 12.3 As sales were above the $22 billion 
19S4 23.9 11.s 11.8 level• ,re might have exr,ected that 
19S5 24.S 10.1 12.2 1n * would ~ greater than P, but the 
feverse "'as true. l>erhans in 1953 
and 1954 investment was antici,,ated 
at less than the long-term proper 
amount in order to reduce the ex-
cess capacity aquired dur:i.ng the 
Korean War, In 195S, where the only 
large deviation occurred, it perhaps 
reflectsthe intention to fill part 
of 8iJ. by a continuation of the in-
ventory disinvestment begun in 1954. 
19S6 27,3 14.6 14.0 The result again conforms to our 
1957 28.0 15.0 14.4 hypothesis, as in 1_9S1 and 1952.
It should be noted that the table shows agreement with the tbeoretical 
interpretation of the relationships in six of nine years covered, and a 
borderline case in 1953, with disagreement arising only in the years 1954 
and 19S5. The three troublesome years occur when the Korean war was ended 
(or about to be ended: we remember that one of Eisenhower's pledges in 1952
was to end that war), which undoubtedly would have a dampering effect on 
expectations This and the subsequent "readjustment"--as we are 1·ront to 
euphemize nowadays should have led us a !ll'iori to expectany variations ----
to have occurred in this period. 
Thus, from the propositions brought forward in section III, concerning 
the relation of investment to sales anticipated and that achieved, an at-
tempt bas been made to present a theoretical explanation of tl~e difference 
between the two equations. It has also been indicated tl1at we may see in 
the proposed explanation a reason for the inherent instability which arises 
from the difference between the two relationships This explanation i4 eo 
8 
that manufacturers anticipated either more or less than they would really 
need (as measured by past presumably satisfactory, achievement on the 
basis of faulty extrapolations. is based on an assumption that manufac-
turers have poor methods of estimating ·future ea~i tal needs. 'lllis we
might readily deduce f'rom o. quick glance at figure 2, where we see that
the anticipated figures are more dispersed than the corresponding points 
in figure 1; the guesses of future requirements were more varied than the 
actual requirements themselves In a study of 17S large stockmarket firms
Brockie and Grey found that ''methods of investment programming are still 
fairly crude in most firms, with programs being closely dependentupon
(a) judgement and (b) performance in the present and immediate past,... 4 
If such a judgement can be levied against a fairly select group of large 
firms how much more crudemay be the methods of smaller fims•--the type 
,-,redominant in the ''Survey" sam·~C! ! 
V 
Having observed a probable source of error in the anticipations 0£ 
•anufacturers, it is time to take a longer look at the possible derivation 
of these anticit,ations. In tbe f.irst case, let us consider the estimation 
of anticipated sales for on what is sa!d · here will be based st\t!!e: subse-
quent assumptions Weassume that the sales of the present year are a 
substantial factor, and that these figures are known by manufacturers
during the timewhen they anticir,ate the amounts for tl1e next year. 1Ience, 
manuafacuers would extrapolate on the basis of this year's esults in 
order to anticipate next year's sales. A means for understanding the ex-
tra'"'<>lation to be presentedis found in a loose interpretation of the 
difference between long-term and sbort-tem expectations It will be 
assumed that lone-term expectations are r;ovcmed by a comparison of this 
year's sales with those of last year, while short-term expectiations are 
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affected simply by this. year's results in comparision with what was an-
anticipated Thus we h•ve two distinct ~·rates of growth:" Sn/Sn-1, governing
erning loncr-term anticipations, S ~*,applying to tile short term, and . tr-n 
both of these are to operate upon 5n to yield the anticipated sales, 
It is natural to expect the operation of either rate singly upon
Sn to be of a multiplicative nature, and it is assumed that the tworates 
operate similarly upon one another. This latter process finds its justifi-
cation in Ca) its simplicity is not proper to describe the crude process
cess of anticipations outlined in section IV by means of complex equations
and (b) it is reasonable to presume that short-term expectationsshould 
interact with those for the long term. 
The result of all these assumptions is the expectation that Sn+l * o< 
Sn • . * * 3 • vsn-1 • 5n1sn , or that sn+l .0(. 5n ISn-iSn • Por the period covering 
anticipated sales from 1950 to 1959, this relation is found: 
* ...sw,3 5 
5n+l • .S87~l5n w + 10.1 · • 
The correlation coefficient for the sample (. ?12) is significantly high 
for the number of degrees of freedom (15) involved. This does not r.1ean that 
the aboveassumptions are "true," but rather tltat they give a fairly close 
description of the situation, which implies that the assumptions are at 
least tenable. It is this last statement toward which this analysis was 
directed• to affirm the reasonableness of the assumptions before proceeding
further. 
Having determined that the preceding assumptions are at least not 
unreasonable, we shall now anply them to the question of anticipated in-
vestment. With the propositions !'resented in section III as background, 
' f' 
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we should feel fairly safe in applying tl1e "t\,ro-fold rate of growth of 
sales argued above to the question of capital programs Thus we should 
presume that in some amount. plans will be affected by a term stating 
* 2 ~ that 1n +l ,l')( 5n In/Sn-1 Sn • The only change from the previous formulation
has been the introduction of the In term in place of the third Sn• This
is not entirely necessary for, as we have seen in section IIJ, there was 
a direct relationship between sales and expenditures both realized and 
anticipated. 'Die forthcoming relationship could have been set up withouttbout 
the 1n term, but for the sake of mathematical simplicity and for a closer 
approximation to the decision-makers• methods which mostlikely include 
investment of the present year as a factor, the form has been altered. 
We now introduce another assumption, one which is hardly disputable in 
view of the volumes written about :lt and the theories founded thereon. A 
variant of the overinvestment hypothesis shall be included as a factor 
involved in the planningof ca"'.i ta.1 investment. As has been discussed in 
sectiori JV, the, e must arise a discrepancy between the actual result and the 
antici?,ated sales or eX"IE!nd!tures or both. An adjustment shall therefore 
be included for the difference between actual plant and equipment expendi-
tures for a civen year.- ana that which tlie year's sates results t10uld presumably
sunably have justified on tl1e basis of anticipations If• for any year, 
manufacturers had in mind a. figure for capital investment (tlle anticipated 
figure) which they felt would be justified at the anticipated level of sales. 
then we should expect them to have a feeling of either overinvestment or 
underinvestment .. depending on the relation of actual sales and cx-iencli-
tures to the fomer anticipations. All this verbal confusion can be conveniently
veniently summarized in a sill!1lle symbolic expression £or the adjustment we
• 
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should expect them to make: 
Discrepancy Adjustment• [ :r,, - ~ 11,* J . 6 
This adjustment would be subtracted from tbe f figure obtained by simple
investment/sales relation-predictions expressing the final derivation
in the form: 
A linear regression for the period 1950-1959 expressedin billions of 
current dollars. gives this expression where P stands for the whole right 
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Pigure 3., 
Anticipated Investment and the proposed function. 
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This is a pleasing result for two reasons, the first of which is 
that the sample correlation coefficient (0865) is highly significant for 
this number of degreesof freedom ClS). In the second place, the coefficient
cient of the variable Pis much higher than in the former relation concerning
sales (.?69 versus .587). This means that the values of the in-
dependent variable CP here, sn3/Sn_1sn* in the former case) are much more 
decisive in determining the values of the result In+i*• than in determining
Sn+l *. This may imply that the investment anticipation relationship 
is closer to tlie true process of anticipations determination thanwas the 
relatively more mechanical model concerning sales. 
This section may be summarized by presenting a proposition that, 
during this period investment, after an allowance for adjustment con-
sidering the previous year's experience, was planned largely on the basis 
of anticipated sales. We have seen that a mechanical interpretation of 
the interaction between long-run and short-run expectations has succeeded 
as an assumption, as it has produced relationships which amply describe 
the data on anticipated sales and investment. 
VI 
The most striking result of the f oregoinc sections is the fact that
investment anticipations and realizations can, in general·, be satisfactori-
ly described in terms of past and present sales. The factor of inventory 
change has not been included as either a stimulant or a depressant on anti-
and we have arrived at a general picture in which this factor 
does not semm to be necessary. 'Ibis is not to assert that inventories are 
-15-
not or were not a real factor in business 111:>vement-Metzler has built up 
a theory of short-term fluctuations founded on changes in inventories---
but that. at first sigbt, it seems stragne to be able to describe this 
period 1•.ithout specific reference to them. 
However, a second inspection indicates that in those years t1hen in-
ventory accumulation bore a fairly regular relation to the level of sales, 
inventory anticipations were already hidden in the figures for the relationship
between anticipated investment and sales. '1he point is macie most 
clenrly by looking at the years in figure 2 ,tich are not virtually u~on 
the regression line. 19S1 and 1952 stand out as years in ,-ilich antici-
pated expemditures \'Jere higher than we should have exriectecl from tlle general
performance, with 19S5 and (to a lesser 'degree") 1950 showing the re-
verse relationsbip. Doth of the former years are those \·1hich were pre-
precededby years of high accumulation of inventories: in 1950 inventories 
rose by $5.5 billion (19.0'£). in 1951 by ~.s billion (24.6~). on the 
other hand, 1950 and 1955 were preceded by years <?f inventory disinvestment
ment: -$2.8 billion (-8.8%) in 19491 and -~2.4 billion (-5.2$) in 19S4. 
'lhe anticipated expenditures for 1957 show no difference from tlte long-
run regression even though ;nventories rose $5.9 billion (12.7%) in 1956. 
The implication of all this is that if the inventory expansion might 
be expectedto continue (sales in both 1950 and 1951 having exceeded the 
amounts anticipated then manufacturers planned to spend more on capital 
than they would have, based on oure sales expectations. 1956 sales did 
not meet expectations. therefore greater than normal inventory accumulation 
was not planned for 1957, and hence the point for 1957 appears near the
regression line. Similarly, concerning expected outlays for 1950 and 1955
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the inventory disinvestment of 1949 and 1954 coupled witit tlle fact that . 
sales declined more than anticipated perha"8 led manufacturers to expect 
a further decline in inventories and• hence. less investment than would 
normally have been planned. 'lhis explanation does not conflict with the 
traditional theory of the effects of the changes jn invent<.'.!ries on in,.. 
vestment. and is al)t)arently only a develor,ment of the notion of a "(ixectn 
sales/inventories ratio. H0t1ever, as a matter of fact there is little 
direct conf'rontation between the two ex,:,lanations: Metzler's theory is 
based on a sudden• unexnected change in inventories and its immediate ef-
fect on plans. 'lhe above exn.lanation covers longer periods of time in 
which the guestion of lags other than one year (as is general throughout 
this !)a~r) has disappeared, and plans are made on the basis of trends 
\1hicll manufacturers may or may not . '1ish to continue. Basing tllis reason-
inc about the deviations from the lone-term trend of figure 2 on inven-
tories seem$ to be reasonable, as deviations occurred only for tllose years 
before ·,·.4iich tllere bad been a sh~!'> chance in the trend of inventorieso 
VII 
It is QJ!Pa.rent at a glance that an attel'lpt to exnlain the deviations 
about the trend of £icure 1 \'lill have to include more factors t11an inven-
tory change. 'lhe deviations are smaller, but there are many more of them 
al though the trend is more 1 eprescntati ve of the data tlUUt in figure 2, 
the correlation coefficient being .944 bere and .016 in figure 2). It 
uill be less confusini; to present if tlle matter is eon~idercd not by sec-
tions devQted t<? the a!ll)lic,tion of a ~Ql'ticular factor to each ye!lr, but 
by bringing forward the possible factors, year by year. Less attention 
will be paid to specific relations here. as the deviations are quite small • 
• 
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l do not choose to split hairs over small variations based on data of 
questionable orecision--instead, a general view of the l)Ossible modi-
fying factors will be ')resented. 
1949---The variation was negligible. 
1950---The fact that investment was below the amount expected from
the long-run relation was not due to purely economic factors, but rather 
to the outbreak of the Korean war. Af!. a result I sales rose very shar.,ly, 
but there was apparently not enough of the year ief t to show the reaction
of investment. 
1951-1952---Investment was· higher than the long-term relation, pro-
bably in major nart due to the continuance of the war I and in ·an attempt
to compensate for the "Underinvestment" of 1950. 
1953---'The variation was negligible: despite a substantial drop in 
unfilled orders. new orders remained steady, and actual sales were almost 
indentical with those antipated
1954-- Capital outlays were below the amount expected for the level 
of sales, but part of the sale~ were filled by inventory disinvestment. 
This exercised a depressing influence on the level of expenditures as sales 
were declining, unfilled orders still falling. A situation of excess capacity
city had developed after the relatively hich investment years of 19S1 and 
19S2. 
1955---Manufacturers were hesitant in emerging from the recession, 
raising their outlays only slightly in the face of increased Sales, new 
orders and backlog.. A J)artial cause of their caution may have been the 
fact that the prices of their sales had risen by 2.6!t since 1953, but the 
price level of producers durables had increased by 3.6S. 
-18-
1956-1957--The continued boom in 1956 drew more than normal ex-
expendituresto compensate for the low le11e1 of 19S5, and in both years 
to assist the building un of inventories. Sales prices increased very 
sharply in these two years (7.3%), the sharpest rise during this period
1949-1957 • which -r,resumably would have provided an inducement to invest
vest, even though prices of producers durables continued their upward
march. 
'VIII 
In figme 1, investment was related to sales; in figure 2, antici-
anticipatedinvestment was related to anticipated sales. 'Dien in section v, 
anticipated investment t·1as related to an adjusted rate of. growth of sales, 
the result of which was seen in figure 3. Using much the same method as 
employed in section VI, \ie shall now investigate the variations about the 
trend found in this latter correlation. Considering the a priori nature 
of the assumntions made in section V, small variations are of even less 
significance as the basis fo,: such a relation is not as obvious as for 
figures 1 and 2. It is more obvious to ~. assumea direct relationship be-
{!;- (A ~~4/ <. '4'--
betweencapital outlays and sales (eitller actual or anticipated than to 
assume that a fairly arbitrary mathematical model describes the actual 
process of' decision. Hence, in an attempt to evaluate the influence of 
other factors only large variations from the regression line will be 
considered. 
As figure 3 is drawn in current dollars, it \1li.ght be apparent that 
some of the variations fran the trend wJll be due tn nr!ce movements. 
'!bus, for exanmle, in 1949 the prices of capital goods rose 5'51 but prices 
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of sales dropped 2$; as we should suppose this combination was not 
conducive to capital anticipation 19S0 appears below the trend line. 
similar reasoning applies to 1954 anticipations based on a rise of 
capital prices greater than the rise of sales prices in 1953. Never-
the less andattempt to explain the variations op the basis of price
changes alone must fail; an orderly pattern of the type just indicated
simply does not appear 1957 anticipations are above the regression
line, although producers durables rose in price by 6% in 1956, while 
sales prices rose only 4½$. This does not deny that prices had an 
effect, but rather implies that the effects were not orderly nor pro-
bably large: we should seek the major reasons elsewhere A similar 
argument .could be presented to justify the emission from consideration 
or that neo-elassical keystone, interest rates I will sumply note 
that Juesenberry has found little effect of interest rates (once one 
i;ets the matter quantified) on investment, due in part to the much lar-
largerfactor of taxes on profits.7 
It may be observed that the years 1951 and 1956 are above the trend 
line in figure 3, whereas the preceding years 1950 and 1955 were below 
the ti end denicted in figurefigure1. 'lhis would imply that attempts were 
being made to counteract the relatively low .investment of the preceding
years. Similarly, the anticipations for 1952 and 1958 are below the 
regression perhaps in attempts to remedy the "overinvestment" occur-
ring in 19S1 and 1957. Futhermore, with the exception of 1952, the 
same inventory argument advanced in section VI seems to be applicab!e. 
If it had been justified in the minds of manufactuers to continue a 
process of rapid accumulation, then we should expectinvestment antici-
anticipationst  be inordinately high, and lower if a continued jnventory 
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disinvestment might be expected. 
Thus the general conclusion of this section (applying also to 
sections VI and VII) is that, in the period 1949-1957, manufacturers' 
investment-sales relations followed fairly defined patterns. Deviations 
around these trends can largely be attributed to themovements of inven-
tories and orders, with a consideration of the effects of the Korean War. 
The factors of smaller movement (prices and interest rates) seem to have 
had no measurable effects, and were overshadowed by larger and more i:,ower-
ful factors. 
IX 
'!here is, however, little evidence to sup'lOrt tlle 
theory that expectations are self-fulfilling. 
'lhe view of the future held by important decision 
makers only partly influences their decisions. And 
their decisions only partly determine the outcome. Many 
things happen that nobody decides, wants, or expects
---v. Lewis Bassie
Ileretofore, the discussion has dweltt upon first the relation of investment
to sales, then that of anticipated investment to anticipated 
sales. We have noted that the difference between the two relationsb.ips 
was sufficient to guarantee a difference between expectationsand reali-
realizationst-ntat, we should now like to know occurred when sales differed 
from their antici.,ated level? At thi.s point we might hone to gain an in-
sight into the dynamics of manufacturers reactions to the real course of 
events. 
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A regression was derived for tlle r,eriod 1949-1957 (see ficure 4. 
below) ,..llich s_ave this relation (ill constant dollars): 
I ·,~~} n = .r.741n , _ + 1.4 • 
~11.-,.d.Ji ''114-/ 5-"J 
'!he aample aegrce••• coefflcient was am-,roximately 1.0. a very unlikely 
} 
occurr-:ace by pure chance at 13 de~rees of freedom. 'lbe fact that this 
hypothesis is ret,resentatiw of the data can easily been seen from figure 
4. Only the point for the year 1951 is relatively distant from the re-
gxession line, and this 
deviation we must attri-
bute to the supply situ-
ation \'l.tich developed as 
a result of the outbreak 
of war.9 ow= faith in 
this relation is further 
substantiated when a simi-
lar relationshiy,, ex-
~essed in c:urrent·do11ars 
is offered as evidence: its 
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atanges of investment and 
sales versus antici~ations. 
cient was .961 at 17 degrees of freedom. 'l'his relationship is tile link 
bet\\leen the two equations presented in. section III, and relates them to 
the· variations from c:xr.,ectations encountered in eaclt year. It contains 
further evidence for the $22 billion ''median° level of sales mentioned 
frequently before. If sales turn out as expected (i.e., Su/Sn*= 1), then 
~nvestment will be greater than anticipated below sales of $22 billion 0 
and less than anticipated above that level. '!he general hypothesis of 
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this paper, that-investment in manufacturing was i,rincii,ally based on 
effective demand, is strongly supported by this relationship, exclucHng 
as it does all other factors. we conclude that manufacturers res.,ondecl 
Q~icldy (within the smne year) to the develc,iments of the year in pro-
gress, and their 1:eactions ~re based upon a comparison between actual 
davclopments and anticipations recnrdinc sales. 
Priend and Bronfenbrenner, in their survey study, came to the op-
r,osite conclusion about the effect of sales on ca"ital outlays.10 'Ibey 
surveyed 30S large fims 1•il\ose 194~ er,enditures had differed from an-
ticipations by twenty-five ~rccnt or more, and found a strong nositiw 
correlation only for those firms which specified sales as the major fac-
tor involved in the.change. Nevertheless, almost all of the factors 
\'lhicll tlley ent111.erated involved an outlook on sules: certainly a firm.•s 
sales experience affects its desire to switch to newer eguipnent or its 
or,inion of the ca-,ital gooc1s ma,rket. 'Iheir stucly can actually ba.ve little 
. . 
connection with tllis pa!,"Cr--the!r studv covered only a Sl!lall select sr,)Up 
of firms. A firm \·:llich deviated tuenty-five percent from its ant.icinations 
could \tell find other reasons than sales to specify. without denyillf; their 
effect. '!his t,a,")(!r has looked only at the aggregnte behavior of the 
group, and must consider the opinions of individual manufacturers as 
merely "interesting." 
X 
In this thesis. manufacturing has largely been dealt with as an 
atomistic, se1£-cont11ined unit within the economy. 'lhis is, of course, 
an extreme oversimplification: demand changes from the rest of the 
economy have an effect on the level of demand within the manufacturing 
sector. Manufacturers produce the major part of all the plant and equipment
ment covered by the data, excluding taxes and non-materials costs included 
in the value of pl.ant and equipment. Expecting to find someevidence of 
an "acceleration principle a regression betweensales and investment 
(t11e converse of that done in section III) lias the form 
Sn= 1.161n + 10.1 0 
and a·significant sample correlation coefficient of .785. Expressed in 
English, manufacturers• sales consisted of approximately the amount spent
by the group for investment plus a constant $10.1 billion. It is inter-
esting to note that the sum of the constant and the average level of in-
vestment ($11.s billion) aporoximates the $22 billion level of sales which 
has played such a large part in the previous considerations. Without a · 
lengthy and involved analysis, it is sufficient to observe that the divi-
sion 0£ sales between durable and non-durable goods gen~.rally follows tile 
proportions indicated by the regression. we should bave exr,ected that in-
vestment. would be less than but nearly a. constant proportion of, durable 
goods sales11 while sales of non-durables should approximate the constant, 
being largely sales to the rest of the economy Further breakdowns both 
by durable versus non-durable goods manufacturers and by size of firm, 
\·!ould shed even more light upon the intcmal processes of the manuf' actur-
manufacturingsector Such examinations will, however be left to future writers of 
theses, when more data will hopefully be available.
The above considerations, giving a general idea of the internal 
relations of the manufacturing sector, combine wjth the previous dis-
cussions of the relationships between investment and effective demand to 
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further demonstrate the potency of tile demand factor. As we have seen. 
investment (both realized and anticipated) is closely related to tlle 
level of (actual or anticipated) sales. Manufacturers, subject to the 
provisos of section I seem to adjust their investment levels to the 
developments of the year in progress Capital outlays for the succeeding 
year can be interpreted to include an adjustment for "over-" or· "underin-
vestment" based on the present year's performance. The acceleration in-
involvedin the fact that that which is one firm'sinvestment is another
firm's sales concludes our investigation of the hypothesis of ••effective 
demand." Subsidiary factors and non-economic developments can account 
for the deviations about tlle regressions. but the main point is clear-
in this period manufacturers• investment behavior was dependent upon 





1 •. .Adjusted on the basis of indices found in u. s. Incane !!!2. Output, 
19S8: investment by tlte price level of r,roducers' durable goods and sales 
by tbe level of prices of all ,molesale commodities excludinc food. 
2 • .Adjusted by the same indices as in note 1 1 but using the prices of 
the year in ,·.lhich the anticipations were made to deflate them. 
. * 3. 'Ihat is, unless by chance Sn and Sn were equal at 22. 
4o M. D. Brockie and A. L. Grey, Jr., "'Ille Marg;na1 Bfficiency of Ca"'ital 
and Investment '!'rogr8Dllling," ''Bconomic Journal," necember 19S6, p. 67S. 
s. Expressed in current dollars, in order not to exclude possible inter-
action between changes in price levels. 
6. If this adjustment 1.~ere set up with t'lore sophistication, as \'Je earlier 
noted that manufacturers anticipated faulty relations between investment 
and sales, the subsequent relationship might even provic;ie a closer fit to 
tlle data. 
1. J~es s. .iJuesenberry, Business 9:c1es !!!2. Economic Grol'. th• Ot:Graw-
Ilill, New York, 1958), pp. 49ff. 
8. Na'i:ional Dureau of .Bconomic 1~escarch, I~cent ~velQJ2!!:!!ts ,!!! Short-
!:!! Poreca.sting, C?lew York, 195S), PP• 10•11. 
9. See the''Survey of' current Dusiness," Pebruary· 1952, esl)Ccial.ly its 
review of the year 19511 and also tlie"Survey0 for 5e">teMber 19S1, pp. 5-7. 
10. Friend and Dronfenbrenner 1 "Plant and f.:.quinment l'rocrams 1 " in l.ecent 
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Courtesy of P::ofessor Wade Bllis. 
~WLATIONSIIIPS P~llSnN'l'llD JN n,IS PAPJ:l.'1, 
Wl'll1 T1mI:'!. DBr:BBS OP P;'Jl!ll>OM, .riND 
SAM"LB co:rnBLATION COBPPl~JllNTS (r),. 
T *' • 736 * ,. f -n • Sn - s.6 1~ d. • r = .816 
13 d.f. r = .944 
* 3 * Sn+t = .S87(5n /Sn-lSn ) + 10.1 
15 d.f,. r = .112 
1n+1 * s • 769f8u
2!ta • - {In- ?.In*,, + 2.8 
ISn-1Sn 8n J 
- 15 d 0 f.'. r= • 86S 
* * In = .874 1n (5n/5n ) + 1.4 
13 1.r. r !J..o 
* * 1n = .930 In C5n/8n ) --:, .7 (cu.1:rent dolla:rs) 
17 d.f,. r a .961 




























ManufaturersAC'l'Un.BHS • sales and investment current dollars
Sales Anticipated Sales Plant and Equipment Ant,. 
$17.6 (billion) $8.3 (billion> 
16.4 11.s 7.2 7o2 
19.3 16.7 8.2 6.7 
22.3 21.4 11.1 lla9 
22.s 23.4 12.0 12.1 
24.S 24.4 12,3 12.0 
23.,S 23.8 11.0 11.4 
26.3 24.s 111114 10.1 
27.7 27.9 1s.o 1s.o 
28.4 29.9 16 .• 0 16.4 
26.2 27.8 11.4 13o2 
29.6 28.6 12.1 12.3 




















Adapted from data 
in se-,tember, 19S8 
"Survey." 
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FIRST REGRESSIONS IN AN OC ECONOMICS HONORS THESIS? 
James G. Scoville, A.B. mcl 1961, A.M., Ph.D. January 8, 2016 
To the best of my knowledge, the attached senior honors thesis, Sales and Investment: Behavior of 
Manufacturers, 1949-57, represents the first use of regression analysis in such papers. If it was the first, 
its story is more than a little odd and unusual. I shared some of this with Hirsch Kasper who suggested I 
write it up to accompany my personal copy of the thesis to some resting place in the Library. 
The summer after my junior year, I worked in the Business Structures Division of the US Department of 
Commerce. My duties focused on the quarterly Survey of Plant and Equipment Expenditures, especially 
the most boring and mundane: verifying the handwritten entries on master sheets for each company 
against the original paper surveys and entering numbers for purchases of used equipment which had 
not been recorded before. There was a roomful of career clericals doing the same thing and I
inadvertently became a "ratebuster," since I wasn't used to pacing myself as they were. Some hostility 
surfaced, but I got the message and spent hours watching the fish in the "National Aquarium," which 
was in the basement of the Commerce building. 
At some point, my job got enriched and I was asked to do a regression or two and given a sheet of paper 
entitled "Simplex method for one or two variables." This I copied on a sheet of Thermofax paper (if you 
know that stuff, you are definitely old enough to be reading this), which I took to Oberlin with me in the 
fall. The data for the regressions came from the Survey of Current Business and other government 
publications. 
Armed with data and Thermofaxed instructions, I was ready for the next step, actually doing the 
regressions. The College did not have (at least available to students) either of the then popular 
mechanical calculating machines {Frieden or Marchant). The pinnacle of quantitative sophistication was 
located in the Government Department where answers to survey questions could be entered on large 
sheets of paper with holes corresponding to potentially interesting "cuts" of the sample (e.g., by 
gender), the sheets placed in a box with corresponding holes so that when a dowel was inserted through 
the box, you could simply lift out all the sheets corresponding to a variable of interest (e.g., females). 
This was of no use to me: regression was the way. Thus, I calculated the various cross-products on a 
slide rule (see parenthetical comment above on Thermofax paper}, added them up with paper and 
pencil, and back to the slide rule for division problems. The rest, as they tritely say, is history. 
But there's a little more that needs to be said: on page 11 a singularly awful sentence has been 
underlined and awarded the epithet "woolly" by my dad, Orlin J. Scoville. "Joe" Scoville also earned a 
Ph. D. in economics at Harvard. So far as I know, he and I are the only father-son pairing to share a 
committee member, John T. Dunlop. 
In 1960, there were (I think) ten of us in the honors seminar. You wrote the paper during fall semester 
and then presented it in the spring. Ken Roose was my advisor; I ran into him in the lobby of Carnegie 
shortly before Christmas break and asked if he wanted to see the paper before I turned it in. He said it 
would be customary or conventional, I don't remember which. Finally, it is interesting that the 1956 
edition of Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (which I have used all my life) does not contain the 
statistical definition of "regression"! I guess my thesis was really ahead of its time. 
